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Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and
Insolvency
Richard Hynes*
Abstract
Economic theory suggests that payday lending can either
increase or decrease consumer welfare. Consumers can use payday
loans to cushion the effects of financial shocks, but payday loans may
also increase the chance that consumers will succumb to temptation
or cognitive errors and seek instant gratification. Both supporters
and critics of payday lending have alleged that the welfare effects of
the industry can be substantial and that the legalization of payday
lending can even have measurable effects on proxies for financial
distress, such as bankruptcy, foreclosure, and property crime. Critics
further allege that payday lenders target minority and military
communities, making these groups especially vulnerable. If the critics
of payday lending are correct, we should see an increase (decrease) in
signs of financial distress after the legalization (prohibition) of
payday lending, and these changes should be more pronounced in
areas with large military or minority populations. This Article uses
county-level data to test this theory. The results, like those of the
existing literature, are mixed. Bankruptcy filings do not increase
after states legalize payday lending, and filings tend to fall in
counties with large military communities. This result supports the
beneficial view of payday lending, but it may be due to states’
incentives in enacting laws. This Article tests the effect of a change in
federal law that should have had a disparate impact according to the
prior choice of state law. This second test does not offer clear support
for either the beneficial or detrimental view of payday lending.
* Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. I thank Josh Fischman,
Paul Mahoney, and participants at workshops at the Washington and Lee
University School of Law, the Harvard–University of Texas Conference on
Commercial Law Realities, the University of Virginia, and the American Law
and Economics Association’s Annual Meeting for valuable comments. I thank
Jon Ashley, Benjamin Grosz, Ben Hurst, and Joe Wynne for valuable research
assistance. All errors remain my own.
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I. Introduction
In a typical payday loan, a consumer writes a $300 check that is
payable in two weeks and receives $255 in cash.1 These terms
translate into an annual percentage rate in excess of 450% and a
compounded interest rate in excess of 6,800% per year.2 Despite
these extremely high rates, the loans are popular; some estimate
that payday lenders extend as much as $50 billion in loans each
year.3
Some scholars and consumer advocates call for strict usury
limits or other laws designed to curtail or eliminate payday
lending,4 and a growing number of state legislatures have heeded
1. See, e.g., Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 169,
169 (2007) (“Thus, a typical example [of a payday loan] would be that in
exchange for a $300 advance until the next payday, the borrower writes a
postdated check for $300 and receives $255 in cash—the lender taking a $45 fee
off the top.”).
2. See id. at 170 (“When the fee for a short-term payday loan is translated
into an annual percentage rate (APR), the implied annual interest rate ranges
between 400 and 1000 percent.”).
3. See id. (“Industry sources estimate more than a six-fold growth in
payday loan volume in the last few years, from about $8 billion in 1999 to
between $40 and $50 billion in 2004.”).
4. See Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Springing the Debt Trap: Rate Caps
Are Only Proven Payday Lending Reform, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 22
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their call.5 We are also likely to see a substantial increase in federal
regulation as the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act6 grants the new Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection authority over payday lenders.7 This Act prohibits the
new bureau from setting an interest-rate cap.8 However, the new
bureau might try to use its authority to regulate “unfair, deceptive,
or abusive” acts to sharply curtail payday lending on the grounds
that these loans cause “substantial injury to consumers” without
offering sufficient countervailing benefits.9
Some argue that payday loans only appear expensive if one
assumes that the consumer has the same options available to the
middle-class critic—many payday loan borrowers are severely credit
constrained.10 A payday loan may be less expensive than bouncing a
check, and payday loans may offer better credit terms than

(Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/researchanalysis/springing-the-debt-trap.pdf (encouraging states to pass a small loan
cap at or around 36%). For a summary of this debate, see Ronald J. Mann & Jim
Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855 (2007).
5. For example, in 2008, Ohio and New Hampshire set maximum annual
interest rates below 50%. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Payday
Lending 2008 Enacted Legislation (Jan. 2009), http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/banking/PaydayLend_2008.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (listing
states that enacted payday lending legislation in 2008) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). For a list of other recent changes, see infra
Table 1.
6. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (establishing financial regulatory
reform in the United States after the financial crisis of the late 2000s).
7. See id. §§ 1001–1100H (establishing the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection and granting it the authority to regulate consumer financial products
and services in compliance with federal law, including payday lenders).
8. See id. § 1027 (setting the limits on the authority of the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection).
9. See id. § 1031 (establishing that the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection can prevent, through regulation, a “service provider from committing
or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act” in a financial product
transaction that would “cause substantial injury to consumers”). For a recent
article discussing the prospect for reform, see Jim Hawkins, The Federal
Government in the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 23 (2011).
10. See, e.g., Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 885 (“It is easy for uppermiddle-class academics that study the topic to think that this lending is unduly
risky and that those that engage in it would be better advised to tighten their
belts and resist the temptation to borrow.”); see also Stegman, supra note 1, at
173 (“Most payday loan customers are highly credit-constrained.”).
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pawnshops and rent-to-own stores.11 More importantly, payday
lending may be better than no credit at all. If a payday loan allows
the consumer to repair her automobile, then it may save the
consumer’s job and prevent further financial difficulties.12 Critics
counter that payday loan borrowers do not repay their loans quickly
and instead renew their loans repeatedly; consumers can become
ensnared in a debt trap and incur hundreds of dollars in fees for
each small loan and can lead to insolvency or bankruptcy.13 Critics
further allege that payday lenders target military and minority
populations,14 making these groups especially vulnerable. Some
scholars take a more agnostic view of payday lending, arguing that
this industry is unlikely to have a significant effect on the financial
health of consumers because the dollar amounts involved are too
small, and the number of available alternatives is too great,15 or
because payday lenders and other fringe credit providers take steps
11. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 887–95 (explaining that payday
lenders may provide better benefits and risks than competing products, such as
subprime credit cards, pawnshops, rent-to-own transactions, and illegal
sources); see also Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains, 102 J. FIN.
ECON. 28, 30 (2011) (“[F]or the majority of people in my sample, no obvious
alternative to a payday loan exists.”).
12. See Morse, supra note 11, at 28 (“Without access to credit, these smallscale personal emergencies can lead to bounced checks, late fees, utility
suspensions, repossessions, and, in some cases, foreclosures, evictions and
bankruptcies.”).
13. See, e.g., Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Phantom Demand: Short-Term
Due Date Generates Need for Repeat Payday Loans, Accounting for 76% of Total
FOR
RESPONSIBLE
LENDING
19
(July
9,
2009),
Volume,
CTR.
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantomdemand-final.pdf (analyzing whether short-term due dates in payday lending
can lead to a debt trap). Parrish and King specifically state:
Being trapped in payday loan debt can have dire consequences for the
financial health of families and their communities. Excess fees of $3.5
billion per year are drained from trapped borrowers who vainly
attempt to retire their payday loan debt. As a result, bank account
closures, credit card delinquencies, delayed bill payment and medical
care, and bankruptcies are more common among payday borrowers
and in communities with access to payday lending and other highcost forms of credit.
Id.
14. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (discussing whether
payday lenders target military and minority populations).
15. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 885 (“[T]hese small loans
probably do not contribute substantially to financial distress and insolvency.”).
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that ensure that their customers repay.16 The existing empirical
literature is inconclusive; some papers find results consistent with
the debt–trap hypothesis while other papers find results consistent
with the positive or agnostic views of payday lending.17
This Article adds to the empirical literature on payday lending
in three ways. First, this Article makes use of the claim that payday
lenders target military and minority populations. If payday lending
does affect financial distress, its effect should not be uniform
throughout the state. We should see a more pronounced effect in
areas where payday lenders actually locate. Measuring the
correlation between the actual location of payday lenders and
financial distress may yield biased results because the expected
amount of financial distress may affect where payday lenders choose
to open their stores. We can, however, mitigate this bias by using
proxies for their choice of location. This Article uses minority,
military, and moderate-income populations as proxies for the
location of payday lenders. The use of these proxies also allows us to
ask whether these groups are particularly vulnerable to payday
lending.
The second contribution is the measure of payday lending. Like
prior articles, this Article makes use of changes in state laws
regulating payday lending across time.18 However, a review of the
annual reports of public corporations reveals that, until recently,
16. See Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link
Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361, 1362 (2011)
(analyzing “policy implications of determining that fringe banking products do
not cause distress”). Hawkins specifically states:
I argue that the link between fringe banking and financial distress is
dubious. Because fringe creditors cannot rely on borrowers’ credit
scores to predict whether they will be repaid, creditors structure
fringe credit products to virtually guarantee repayment. Because
repayment is guaranteed by the structure of the transaction, it is
nearly impossible for borrowers to take on unmanageable debt loads.
Id. at 1361–62.
17. Compare supra note 13 and accompanying text (suggesting that there
is evidence to support the debt–trap hypothesis in some communities with
access to payday lending), with supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text
(providing examples of papers that take a more agnostic view of payday
lending).
18. See, e.g., infra note 58 and accompanying text (referring to an article
that made use of changes in Georgia’s state laws regulating payday lending
across time to test the debt–trap hypothesis).
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payday lenders had stores in states where their loans were illegal
under state law.19 Payday lenders were able to charge rates in
excess of state usury limits by partnering with out-of-state banks,20
but the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) effectively
ended these partnerships in 2005.21 This paper makes use of this
change in federal law as a natural experiment; the change in federal
law should have had little effect in states where payday lending was
legal under state law.
This Article follows the literature in using the bankruptcy filing
rate as a proxy for financial distress. However, just the attorneys’
fees for a bankruptcy filing can be more than a thousand dollars,22
and many consumers may be too broke to file. This Article,
therefore, supplements this measure with property crime rates and
the rate at which landlords sue to evict their tenants.23
19. See, e.g., Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 879 (analyzing that
recently many of the large national providers of payday loans had locations in
Texas). While Texas law has unfavorable usury laws for payday lenders, these
national providers were able to bypass Texas state law by partnering with outof-state banks. Id. In effect, when the national providers partnered with the outof-state banks, they were able to import the out-of-state banks’ rates. Id.
20. For example, the 2004 Annual Report for Advance America states:
As of December 31, 2004, pursuant to our processing, marketing and
servicing agreements with the lending banks, we are the processing,
marketing and servicing agent for payday cash advances offered,
made and funded by BankWest, Inc., a South Dakota bank . . . in
Pennsylvania, First Fidelity Bank, a South Dakota bank, in
Michigan, Republic Bank & Trust Company, a Kentucky bank . . . in
North Carolina and Texas and Venture Bank, a Washington bank, in
Arkansas.
ADVANCE AM., INC., ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K) (Mar. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1299704/000104746905008577/a215421
3z10-k.htm.
21. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 873 (“In July 2005, however, the
FDIC issued its Guidelines on Payday Lending. . . . In practice, these new
regulations have made it impractical for state-chartered banks to continue
partnering with the major national providers.”); Stegman, supra note 1, at 179
(“[I]n March 2005 the FDIC further tightened its guidance . . . render[ing] the
rent-a-bank model obsolete.”).
22. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing average attorneys’
fees in various bankruptcy filings).
23. Adair Morse also looks at property crime. See Morse, supra note 11, at
29 (analyzing whether payday “loans mitigate or exacerbate the effect of
financial distress on individuals’ welfare as measured by foreclosures and small
property crimes”). Also, Brian Melzer uses various measures drawn from survey
data. See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the
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This Article’s results match the conflict currently found in the
literature. The regressions that utilize changes in state law are
more consistent with the beneficial view of payday lending than the
debt–trap hypothesis. When a state legalizes payday lending,
bankruptcy filing rates tend to fall in counties with large military
communities—one of the communities that payday lenders allegedly
target. By contrast, the regressions that make use of the change in
federal law do not produce robust results that support either the
beneficial view of payday lending or the debt–trap hypothesis.
Part II reviews the current payday-lending debate. Part III
briefly describes the regulation of payday lending, and Part IV
presents the results. Part V concludes.
II. The Payday-Lending Debate
The fact that consumers use payday loans suggests that they
believe that these loans will, on average, improve their welfare.
Consumers who suffer income or expense shocks (e.g., a medical bill,
a car repair, etc.) may lack the savings necessary to pay in cash. A
payday loan could be a cost-effective means of paying these bills; the
extremely high annual interest rates may overstate the true cost of
payday loans for consumers who repay quickly. Much of the roughly
$50 charged for a $300 loan may be needed to cover inherent
transaction costs, as other small-scale financial transactions require
large fees. For example, Western Union charges $27 to send $300
within the United States.24 The interest rate for a payday loan is
dramatically higher than the rates charged by some other lenders,
such as credit card issuers, but the consumer may have reached her
credit limit and she may be unable to find a loan on more attractive
terms.25 If the consumer is severely credit constrained, a payday
Payday Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 517 (2011) (using mainly data
related to geographic differences in the availability of payday loans from survey
data to assess “the real effects of credit access among low-income households”).
24. This is the price for the online service. It is slightly cheaper ($24) to
send money from one of their locations. Compare and Price Western Union
Services, WESTERN UNION, https://wumt.westernunion.com/WUCOMWEB/
shoppingAreaAction.do;jsessionid=dtee6Ms2Vg_nf8fQx0tCsfN?method=load&co
untryCode=US&languageCode=en&nextSecurePage=Y (last visited Apr. 10,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. See Morse, supra note 11, at 30 (“Research covering the last three
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loan can help her withstand these shocks and improve her welfare.
On the other hand, research suggests that at least some payday
loan borrowers were not credit constrained and could have used
credit cards or other sources to borrow more cheaply.26 Moreover, a
number of scholars allege that consumers may be unable to control
their impulses or suffer from cognitive failures that cause them to
unduly prefer current over future consumption.27 For these debtors,
a relaxation of their credit constraint may reduce their welfare.
A number of prior studies have suggested that the legalization
of payday lending can have substantial welfare effects and can even
have measurable effects on proxies for financial distress, such as the
number of bankruptcy filings,28 home foreclosures, and property
crimes.29 Other scholars doubt these claims as a theoretical
decades finds that up to 20% of U.S. residents are credit constrained . . . . When
expense or income shocks arrive, banks and credit cards usually do not provide
these constrained borrowers with distress loans.”).
26. See Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday
Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Scoring Puzzles 7 (Working Paper,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327125
(“Regarding liquidity, we find that most account holders with a major credit
card issuer have substantial unused liquidity on their credit cards at the time
they borrow on payday loans.”); Susan P. Carter, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy
Tobacman, Pecuniary Mistakes? Payday Borrowing by Credit Union Members 1
(Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2010-32, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1707657
(“We
observe
substantial payday loan use when cheaper sources of liquidity are
available . . . .”).
27. See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112
Q.J. ECON. 443, 443 (1997) (“Hyperbolic discount functions induce dynamically
inconsistent preferences, implying a motive for consumers to constrain their
own future choices.”).
28. See, e.g., Donald P. Morgan & Michael R. Strain, Payday Holiday: How
Households Fare After Payday Credit Bans 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Working Paper No. 309, 2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.
org/research/staff_reports/sr309.pdf (noting that after a particular credit ban,
households in Georgia “were more likely to file for bankruptcy”); Paige Marta
Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 1 (Vand.
Univ. Law School Law & Econs., Working Paper No. 11-13, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1266215 (“We find evidence
that access to payday loans does increase personal bankruptcy rates.”). But see
Petru S. Stoianovici & Michael T. Maloney, Restrictions on Credit: A Public
Policy Analysis of Payday Lending 1 (Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1291278 (“Using state-level
data between 1990 and 2006, we find no empirical evidence that payday lending
leads to more bankruptcy filings . . . .”).
29. See Morse, supra note 11, at 29 (analyzing whether payday “loans
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matter.30 In an earlier era, some economists argued that usury
limits had no real effect on debt levels because they merely caused
consumers to switch to other forms of credit, such as retail store
credit, that were effectively unregulated.31 The same may be true of
payday lending. In the absence of payday loans, consumers may
have been able to use other substitutes to meet short-term cash
needs or to overspend.32
Some scholars suggest that the dollar amounts of payday loans
are too small to have a material effect on financial hardship.33 Those
who argue that payday lending can have measurable effects claim
that a problem that is small, initially, can lead to a much larger
problem. For example, Adair Morse argues that if a consumer lacks
access to payday loans and other forms of credit, then even a smallscale emergency can lead to substantial delinquency fees that can in
turn lead to major problems, such as foreclosure, eviction, and/or
bankruptcy.34 Industry critics argue that payday lending can
ensnare consumers in a “debt trap.”35 Many debtors do not repay
mitigate or exacerbate the effect of financial distress on individuals’ welfare as
measured by foreclosures and small property crimes”).
30. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 885 (“[B]ecause the
overwhelming majority of payday lending transactions do not result in default
on the part of the borrower, there is some reason to think that many of the
transactions benefit both the borrower and the lender.”).
31. See, e.g., Richard L. Peterson, Usury Laws and Consumer Credit: A
Note, 38 J. FIN. 1299, 1299 (1983) (“Since funds are highly fungible, it is likely
that consumers are able to substitute retail-originated credit for other sources of
consumer credit at low cost.”).
32. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 886–95 (discussing that it would
be near impossible to stop consumers from borrowing money if there is a great
economic demand for consumer borrowing, even if that means consumers must
turn to pawnshops, rent-to-own stores, or illegal sources).
33. See, e.g., id. at 885–86 (“[T]hese small loans probably do not contribute
substantially to financial distress and insolvency.”).
34. See Morse, supra note 11, at 29 (explaining what may happen to a
consumer lacking access to payday loans in a small-scale emergency). Adair
Morse specifically states:
Without access to credit, these small-scale personal emergencies can
lead to bounced checks, late fees, utility suspensions, repossessions,
and, in some cases, foreclosures, evictions and bankruptcies. The
United States works very much on a fee-based system for
delinquencies, such that once low-margin individuals get into
distress, they often end up in a cycle of debt.
Id.
35. See Stegman, supra note 1, at 176 (“The strongest critics say that
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their loans quickly but instead roll over their debt by taking out a
new loan to repay the first loan. The Center for Responsible Lending
suggests that these repeat borrowers account for the vast majority
(76%) of payday loans.36 In 2008, over 20% of Virginia’s payday loan
borrowers had thirteen or more payday loans, and the average
number of loans taken out by a borrower was 7.7.37 A recent study of
Oklahoma borrowers suggests that in the first year after the
average borrower takes out a payday loan, the borrower will be
indebted for 212 days.38 Each time a consumer takes out a new loan,
the consumer must pay a new set of fees. At roughly $15 to $30 per
$100 for each two-week loan, the total fees can quickly exceed the
amount originally borrowed. Brian Melzer estimates that about 40%
of payday borrowers pay at least $500 in interest each year and that
10% pay “upwards of $1000 in interest annually.”39
In a recent article, Jim Hawkins argued that “the link between
fringe banking and financial distress is dubious . . . [b]ecause
repayment is guaranteed by the structure of the transaction, [and] it
is nearly impossible for borrowers to take on unmanageable debt
loads.”40 A relatively small percent of payday loans are charged off
payday loans are the credit market’s equivalent of crack cocaine; a highly
addictive source of easy money that hooks the unwary consumer into a
perpetual cycle of debt . . . . Empirical evidence of the rollover phenomenon and
serial borrowing through payday lending abounds.”).
36. See King & Parrish, supra note 13, at 3 (“Short-term due date
generates need for repeat payday loans, accounting for 76% of total volume.”).
37. See BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., STATE CORP. COMM’N, COMMONWEALTH OF
VA., THE 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
PAYDAY LENDER LICENSEES, CHECK CASHERS, AND MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE LENDER
LICENSEES 7 (2010), available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/bfi/annual/ar0410.pdf (stating that 90,155 of 437,025 payday loan borrowers in 2008 took out
more than thirteen loans, and the average number of loans taken out by a
borrower was 7.7). Virginia enacted new legislation that took effect in January
of 2009, and the number of repeat borrowers (and the volume of payday lending
in Virginia) declined precipitously. The total volume of payday loans declined
from $1,327,345,367 in 2008 to just $170,998,829 in 2010. Id. The number of
individuals who received more than thirteen loans declined from 309,951 in
2008 to just one in 2010. Id.
38. See Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Payday Loans, Inc.: Short on Credit,
Long on Debt, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 1 (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/payday-loaninc.pdf (“[I]n their first year of payday loan use, borrowers are indebted an
average of 212 days.”).
39. Melzer, supra note 23, at 549.
40. Hawkins, supra note 16, at 1361–62.
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as uncollectible.41 For example, in 2008, Virginia payday lenders
charged off just 3.2% of their loans as uncollectible,42 well below the
average national credit card charge-off rate of 5.5% reported by
banks in that year.43 To the extent that many payday loans are
rolled over, the low charge-off rates are very misleading.44 Payday
borrowers are not financially secure. Returning to the Virginia data
again, payday lenders received approximately one bad check for
every 2.5 individuals who took out a payday loan in 2008, and they
charged off more than one bad check for every 4.2 individuals who
took out a loan.45 Virginia took steps to limit the number of payday
loans that an individual could take out in a single year,46 and the
percentage of loans charged off as uncollectible rose substantially to
41. Some argue that the loss rate (bad loan losses divided by the total
amount of loans made) for payday loans is so low that payday lenders need not
worry about default and, therefore, the high interest rates are unjustified. See,
e.g., Stegman, supra note 1, at 180 (“And the payday lender doesn’t have much
to worry about, either. The ultimate default rate is 2% of gross loan
receivables.”).
42. In 2008, Virginia’s payday lenders charged off $42,482,127 as
uncollectible and extended $1,327,345,367 in payday loans. BUREAU OF FIN.
INSTS., supra note 37, at 7.
43. Fed. Reserve Bd., Charge-Off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and
Leases at Commercial Banks (Nov. 2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/chargeoff/chgallsa.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. To get a sense of scale, assume that there is a 3% chance that a
consumer will default on each loan and that the probability of default does not
depend on the number of loans. A consumer who borrows thirteen payday loans
in a year has about a 33% chance of defaulting on at least one payday loan (this
is just one minus 0.97 raised to the power of thirteen). These assumptions are
made for illustrative purposes; they are almost certainly incorrect. Consumers
who take out more payday loans may be either more or less likely to default on a
single loan than a consumer who just takes out one loan. In addition, the
probability of default should be higher than the charge-off rate because the
creditor may collect something after default. In fact, Virginia creditors are able
to collect in full on more than half of the checks that initially return unpaid. See
BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 37, at 7 (stating that in Virginia, in 2010, a
total of 50,455 borrower checks were returned unpaid, but of these returned
checks, 29,981 were ultimately paid).
45. See id. (stating that in 2008, 437,025 individuals in Virginia took out a
payday loan, 176,632 checks were returned as unpaid, the payday lenders
received payments on 76,724 of these checks, and they charged off 104,832
checks as uncollectible).
46. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 5 (listing states,
including Virginia, that enacted payday lending legislation in 2008).
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9.6% in 2010,47 slightly higher than the average credit card chargeoff rate that year of 9.4%.48 The rate at which lenders received bad
checks fell slightly (one bad check for every 4.3 borrowers in 2010).49
Payday lending did not cause the insolvency of all of these
consumers. Many consumers use these loans for necessities and
financial emergencies; these consumers were in financial trouble
before they found their way to the payday lender. Those who defend
high-interest loans use this fact to argue that payday loans may
even reduce financial distress by allowing the consumer to take care
of immediate problems (such as overdue rent) before they can
become much worse problems (such as eviction).50
Whether payday lending causes or deepens financial distress or
insolvency is a question that should play an important role in the
policy debate. If no link is shown, critics of the industry could still
argue that the tests or proxies are not sufficiently sensitive to find
any effect. However, the absence of a measured effect makes it less
likely that any effect is economically significant. Critics may also
argue in favor of the elimination of these loans, even in the absence
of a rise in signs of financial distress, by arguing that they are a
horrible deal for consumers. However, there are a number of other
goods and services that would appear to be a horrible deal for
consumers in general, the poor in particular, and these products do
not evoke the same level of passion as high-interest loans.
A finding that payday loans increase financial distress or
insolvency is also insufficient to show that these loans should be
banned. We could probably reduce insolvency by banning consumer
credit,51 but this would almost certainly reduce welfare. If
47. See id. (showing that Virginia payday lenders extended $170,988,829 in
payday loans and charged-off $16,406,588 as uncollectible).
48. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 43.
49. See BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 37, at 7 (showing that 146,319
individuals took out a payday loan, that 50,455 borrower checks were returned
unpaid, and that 33,723 checks were ultimately returned as uncollectible).
50. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 11, at 29 (“Without access to credit, these
small-scale personal emergencies can lead to bounced checks . . . repossessions,
and, in some cases, foreclosures, evictions and bankruptcies.”).
51. I say “probably” because consumers may be rendered insolvent (at least
on a cash flow basis) by involuntary claims such as tort judgments or quasivoluntary claims such as medical bills. Consumer credit may reduce these forms
of insolvency by allowing the consumer to use future earnings to pay current
expenses.
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consumers consider the risk of insolvency when borrowing, then no
regulation is necessary. Policymakers may, however, believe that
consumers suffer from cognitive failure52 or fail to consider the effect
of their insolvency on third parties.53 Policymakers may, therefore,
wish to have some idea of the magnitude of the effect that payday
lending has on insolvency. Unfortunately, the results of the
literature are inconclusive.54
Some prior empirical studies support the debt–trap hypothesis.
Brian Melzer uses a survey in which households report when they
have difficulty paying their mortgage, rent, or utility bill, or when
they move out of their home due to financial difficulties, or when
they delay medical or dental care due to financial circumstances.55
He focuses on the response of households in three states that
prohibit payday lending (Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New
York) and reports that households in counties that border states
that allow payday lending are more likely to report financial trouble
than households in other parts of the state.56 He further tests
52. This argument is sometimes phrased in vague terms of “overoptimism.”
However, overoptimism can lead consumers to borrow either too little or too
much. See Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L.
REV. 127, 127 (2004) (stating that while scholars have “long argued that
overoptimism causes consumers to overborrow,” some forms of overoptimism
“may actually cause consumers to borrow less than they would if they accurately
perceived the risks they face”).
53. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 884 (“Specifically, there is good
reason to think that financial distress generates costs for society as a whole that
are not borne by the parties to the transaction.”). The effect of the externality of
debt is theoretically ambiguous. Consumers may borrow too much because they
fail to consider the effect of their insolvency on their friends, family, or social
safety net. They may also borrow too little because they fail to consider the
benefits that their friends and family derive from the additional consumption
possible due to the borrowing. They may also fail to consider the benefits to the
social safety net if their borrowing allows them to recover from a financial shock
more quickly and therefore not need as much social assistance.
54. For a recent review of the literature, see John P. Caskey, Payday
Lending: New Research and the Big Question (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.
Working Papers Research Dep’t, Paper No. 10-32, 2010), available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/
2010/wp10-32.pdf.
55. See Melzer, supra note 23, at 517 (describing the survey factors used in
Melzer’s study on the effects of credit access among low-income households).
56. See id. at 533 (“The estimated coefficient on PaydayAccess is positive in
each family hardship regression, which means that families in payday access
areas report more financial problems.”).
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whether households experience an unusual increase in financial
trouble if they border a state that has recently legalized payday
lending, and two of his nine measures of hardship show results that
are statistically significant at the 10% level.57 Dennis Campbell, F.
Asis Jerez, and Peter Tafano examine the rate at which banks close
accounts without the consent of the account holder, and they find
that after Georgia banned payday lending this rate was lower in
Georgia’s counties than in the counties of the neighboring states.58
Their results are consistent with the debt–trap hypothesis, but they
are also consistent with banks closing troubled accounts that are
less profitable due to the loss of overdraft fees as consumers use a
cheaper alternative—payday loans.59
Paige Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman used individual-level data
from a payday lender in Texas and found that applicants who were
given a payday loan were more likely to file for Chapter 13
bankruptcy within one or two years than those who were denied the
loan.60 None of their specifications found a statistically significant
effect on the rate at which consumers chose the more common form
of bankruptcy, Chapter 7.61 North Carolina banned payday lending
57. Id. at 539–40, tbl. V. “Moved Out” (defined as moving out of one’s home
or apartments) and “Any Care Postponed” (defined as the postponement or
delay of any type of health care) are statistically significant at the 10% level,
and “Any Family Hardship” (defined as when a family experiences hardships,
such as reducing meals because of lack of money) and “Drug Purchase
Postponed” (defined as an indicator for whether an individual has forgone or
postponed needed care because of a lack of money or insurance) are close. See id.
at 526–47 (defining the measures used for the study and testing how access to
payday loans affect economic hardship).
58. See Dennis Campbell, F. Asis Martinez-Jerez & Peter Tufano,
Bouncing Out of the Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary
Account Closures 26–30 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1335873 (exploring the link
between access to payday lending and involuntary closure activity after the
state of Georgia banned payday lending in 2004).
59. See Brian Melzer & Donald P. Morgan, Competition and Adverse
Selection in a Consumer Loan Market: The Curious Case of Overdraft vs. Payday
Credit 1 (Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.kellogg.north
western.edu/faculty/melzer/ (suggesting that the presence of payday loans may
make deposit accounts riskier and less profitable).
60. See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 28, at 1 (finding evidence that
“access to payday loans does increase personal bankruptcy rates”).
61. See id. at 2 (“We find no significant effects on chapter 7 bankruptcies.”).
Paige Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman suggest that because payday borrowers have
income, they may be encouraged to file under Chapter 13 by either their lawyers
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in 2005, and a survey of low- and middle-income North Carolinians
and former payday borrowers suggests that these groups
overwhelmingly view the absence of payday lending as beneficial
rather than harmful.62 However, less than 8% of those contacted
completed the survey, and there is a very large risk that those who
bothered to respond are not representative of the entire sample.63
A few studies focus on the impact that payday lending has on
military or minority populations. Steven Graves and Christopher
Peterson find that payday lenders tend to open stores in areas with
large military populations.64 Similarly, Micahel Stegman and
Robert Faris and the Center for Responsible Lending find that
payday lenders are more likely to concentrate in areas with large
minority populations.65 My own empirical methodology relies on the
accuracy of these results, but the results themselves are
normatively ambiguous. It is possible that these are simply groups
who have a greater need for short-term credit. Scott Carrell and
Jonathon Zinman provide more direct evidence of a harmful effect;

or the bankruptcy judges. Id. An alternative explanation is that these debtors
may lack the cash necessary to pay the fees necessary to file under Chapter 7.
By filing under Chapter 13, they can pay their attorneys over time.
62. See Univ. of N.C. Ctr. for Cmty. Capital, North Carolina Consumers
After Payday Lending: Attitudes and Experiences with Credit Options, CTR. FOR
CMTY. CAPITAL, 1 (Nov. 2007), http://ccc.unc.edu/documents/NC_After_
Payday.pdf (“More than twice as many former payday borrowers reported that
the absence of payday lending has had a positive rather than a negative effect
on their household.”).
63. See id. at 2 (“The cooperation rate was a low 7.79%, primarily because
we were unable to contact anyone at many of the numbers called.”).
64. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending
and the Military: The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 654 (2005) (stating that the article “provides geographic
evidence that payday lenders do aggressively target American military
personnel, irrespective of most forms of legal regulation”).
65. See Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business
Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 13 (2003)
(noting that one study, for example, showed that Charlotte, NC fringe banks
“disproportionately favored high-minority neighborhoods”); see also Wei Li et al.,
Predatory Profiling: The Role of Race and Ethnicity in the Location of Payday
Lenders in California, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 25 (Mar. 26, 2009),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/california/ca-payday/research-analysis/
predatory-profiling.pdf (“We find that payday lenders tend to locate closer to
and cluster in African American and Latino communities.”).
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they find that payday lending reduces the performance and
retention of Air Force personnel.66
The evidence in favor of the debt–trap hypothesis must be
balanced against a number of studies that are clearly inconsistent
with the theory. Jonathon Zinman measures changes in
employment and subjective descriptions of well-being in Oregon and
Washington surrounding the imposition of a binding rate cap in
Oregon in 2007.67 His results suggest that Oregon’s prohibition of
payday lending caused: (i) consumers to shift to more expensive
sources of credit such as bank overdraft protection, (ii) a fall in
employment, (iii) a fall in subjective measures of financial wellbeing, and (iv) an increase in the rate at which telephones are
disconnected.68 However, Zinman’s data are taken from the first five
months after the imposition of the rate cap, and he acknowledges
that these short-run effects may differ from the long-term effects.69
Adair Morse focuses on the ability of consumers to use payday
lending to smooth income after a financial shock.70 Specifically, she
measures the resiliency of communities after natural disasters and
finds that communities with greater concentrations of payday
lenders see a smaller increase in the rate of foreclosure and a
smaller increase in the crime rate.71 Morse acknowledges that her
66. See Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan
Access and Military Personnel Performance 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.
Working Papers Research Dep’t, Paper No. 08-18, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1269414
(finding
that
payday lending has produced “significant average declines in overall job
performance and retention” in Air Force personnel).
67. See Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household
Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN.
546, 546 (2009) (“I examine some short-run effects of restricting access, using
household panel survey data on payday loan users collected around the
imposition of binding restrictions on payday loan terms in Oregon.”).
68. See id. at 554 (discussing the results of Zinman’s study using household
survey data on the effects of restricting access to expensive consumer credit on
payday loan users).
69. See id. at 553 (acknowledging that “short-run measures may capture
transitional rather than equilibrium outcomes,” and that “[b]orrowers may need
time to adjust to the new regime”).
70. See Morse, supra note 11, at 38–43 (studying the welfare effects of
access to payday loans for credit-constrained individuals due to financial shock).
71. See id. at 29 (explaining that payday lenders can mitigate the number
of foreclosures in a given area in the year following a natural disaster, and the
“results indicate that payday lenders alleviate individuals’ need to resort to
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test focuses on the possibly beneficial effect of payday lending
(helping the consumer withstand an income or expense shock), and
that payday lending could also increase financial distress among
consumers who suffer from cognitive failures.72
Donald Morgan and Michael Strain use the Survey of
Consumer Finance and find that consumers who are deemed to be
more vulnerable to predatory lending are less likely to report
missing a debt payment if they live in a state that allows payday
lending.73 Critics of payday lending may argue, however, that a
single missed debt payment does not adequately capture the concept
of a debt trap. Payday lending may indeed help the consumer
mitigate a temporary setback by allowing her to borrow more to pay
old debts. However, an increased debt burden may increase the
chance that the consumer experiences more serious credit problems.
Donald Morgan and Michael Strain find that states that legalize
payday lending tend to experience a decline in variables capturing
household credit problems relative to other states, and that states
that abolish payday lending experience an increase in these
variables.74 Specifically, they find that complaints against debt
collectors, automobile and mobile home repossession rates, and
bankruptcy filings all increase in states that ban payday lending
and decrease in states that liberalize restrictions on payday
lending.75 Their results rest on the effects of legal changes in just
four states, but Petru Stoinanovici and Michael Maloney also use
small property crimes in times of financial distress”).
72. See id. (“Because I do not identify the net benefit of payday lending
across the distribution of borrowers, my results . . . do not speak to the effect on
those habitually falling to temptation. In this sense, payday lenders can be both
heroes and villains.”).
73. Donald P. Morgan & Michael R. Strain, Defining and Detecting
Predatory Lending 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Working Paper No. 273, 2007),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr273.pdf (noting
that consumers that are more vulnerable to predatory lending and “happen to
live in states that allow unlimited payday loans” are actually “less likely to have
missed a debt payment over the previous year”).
74. See Morgan & Strain, supra note 28, at 24 (explaining the results of the
study suggest household credit “problems appear less persistent when larger
payday loans are available”).
75. See id. at 26 (suggesting states that ban payday lending do not seem
better off because “they have bounced more checks, complained more about
lenders and debt collectors, and have filed for Chapter 7 (‘no asset’) bankruptcy
at a higher rate”).
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state-level bankruptcy data and changes in the regulation of
bankruptcy filing, and they too find no evidence that payday lending
increases bankruptcy filings.76 However, the use of state-level data
may mask any adverse effects on the groups that are allegedly the
targets of payday lenders: minorities and the military. Lars Lefgren
and Frank McIntyre use zip-code-level data and find no evidence in
their cross-sectional regressions that payday lending impacts the
bankruptcy filing rate.77 However, they do not test for a possible
interaction between payday lending and military and minority
communities, and the use of a single time period makes it much
more difficult to control for the effect of omitted variables.
III. The Regulation of Payday Lending
Consumer advocacy groups provide thorough summaries of the
laws regulating payday lending,78 and so this Part will only outline
some basic elements of the law to motivate the tests presented
below. Subpart A describes the state laws regulating payday
lending, and subpart B describes the federal law.
A. State Regulation
Most states have usury laws that prohibit loans with very high
interest rates. Early payday lenders argued that these laws did not
apply because they were not making loans and that they were

76. See Stoianovici & Maloney, supra note 28, at 1 (“Using state-level data
between 1990 and 2006, we find no empirical evidence that payday lending
leads to more bankruptcy filings . . . .”).
77. See Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of CrossState Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 367 (2009)
(revealing, using zip-code-level data, that “payday loan regulations contribute
virtually nothing to the cross-state variance in filing rates”).
78. See, e.g., Leah A. Plunkett, Emily Caplan & Nathanael Player, Small
Dollar Loan Products Score Card–Updated, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. 2–4
(May 7, 2010), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_
loans/cu-small-dollar-scorecard-2010.pdf (providing a summary of how states
are exercising their authority under state laws involving payday loans, autotitle loans, and other various short-term loans); see also Mann & Hawkins,
supra note 4, at 871–80 (providing an overview of laws regulating payday
lending).
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charging fees instead of interest.79 Lenders have also sought to
evade usury limits by disguising their loans. For example, the
Consumers Federation of America claims that a growing number of
lenders recharacterize payday loans as short-term Internet access
contracts with up-front cash rebates.80
More recently, payday lenders have succeeded in lobbying for
explicit regulations that exempt them from standard usury laws.81
These laws vary along several dimensions, including the
requirements to obtain a license, the disclosures that a lender must
provide to a consumer, the number of times that a lender can “roll
over” a loan, and the number of loans that a consumer can have at
any one time. Some of these differences could have real effects on
consumers, especially in states that have databases that allow the
regulator to gather real-time data from all payday lenders.
However, this Article will focus solely on whether payday lending is
prohibited in a state.
This Article makes use of the time series variation in payday
lending. Payday lending has always been illegal in some states and
always legal in others due to a lack of usury restrictions. However,
the wave of legislation exempting payday lenders from usury laws
occurred in the late 1990s and early years of this century, and some
states have recently banned payday lending by, for example,
capping interest rates at a level at which a lender cannot profitably
extend very short-term loans.82 This Article matches these changes
to measures of financial distress.

79. See Jean Ann Fox, Unsafe and Unsound: Payday Lenders Hide Behind
FDIC Bank Charters to Peddle Usury, CONSUMERS FED’N OF AM. 7 (Mar. 30,
2004,
www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/pdlrentabankreport.pdf
(“Early
payday
lenders used inventive schemes to hide the true nature of their loans.”).
80. See id. at 8 (noting that lenders in a growing number of states, such as
North Carolina and Indiana, are using the sale of Internet access contracts to
disguise their payday lending operations).
81. See id. at 6 (“Payday loan laws enacted in states that also have small
loan rate caps and/or usury laws exempt payday loans from application of those
laws, granting lenders safe harbor from usury.”).
82. See infra Appendix (providing state laws on payday lending for all fifty
states).
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B. Federal Regulation

Many generally applicable consumer lending laws (such as the
Truth in Lending Act83) apply to payday loans, and in 2007,
Congress prohibited lenders from charging more than 36% interest
on loans to military personnel and their dependents.84 However, the
most significant federal legislation for the purposes of this Article’s
analysis is the ability that federal law grants to federal and state
banks to charge interest in excess of the usury limits imposed by the
state where the borrower resides. According to the National Bank
Act,85 a nationally chartered bank can charge any rate permitted by
the state where it is located,86 and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act87 gives state-chartered banks the same right.88 Some lenders
partnered with out-of-state banks so that they could lend in states
with strict usury limits.89 In 2000 and 2001, the Comptroller of the
Currency took steps to prevent nationally chartered banks from
forming partnerships with payday lenders, and in 2005, the FDIC
adopted regulations designed to discourage state chartered banks
from forming these partnerships.90 According to Ronald Mann and
83. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006) (establishing
generally applicable consumer lending laws designed to promote the informed
use of consumer credit).
84. See 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2006) (stating a creditor “may not impose an
annual percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the
consumer credit extended to a covered member” of the armed forces or their
dependents).
85. See National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–216d (2006) (creating a
federal–state dual structure banking system in the United States by
establishing a system of national charters for banks).
86. See id. § 85 (“Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on
any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other
evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where
the bank is located.”); see also Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978) (noting a designated national bank may charge interest
rates governed by federal law).
87. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1831aa (2006)
(establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to insure the deposits
of specified banks and savings associations).
88. See id. § 1831d(a) (stating that “to prevent discrimination against
State-chartered insured depository institutions,” state-chartered banks may
charge any rate permitted by the state where it is located).
89. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (providing Advance America
as an example of a payday lender that is partnering with out-of-state banks).
90. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 873 (explaining that the FDIC’s
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Jim Hawkins, “[B]y early 2006, the rent-a-charter era had come to
an end.”91
One could argue that payday lending was legal in every state
until the FDIC eliminated the partnerships between payday lenders
and out-of-state banks. However, this argument almost surely
overstates the importance of these partnerships. First, the prior
literature suggests that some states, such as New York, were able to
effectively prohibit payday lending even before the FDIC reforms by
challenging the claim that the out-of-state bank made the payday
loan.92 Second, very small firms dominated the payday lending
market during the period studied by this Article,93 and these firms
may have found it too costly to partner with an out-of-state bank. I
therefore conduct two tests. The first uses a measure (Payday) that
asks simply whether payday lending was legal under state law in
the prior year. The second uses a measure (FDIC) that focuses solely
on the change in federal law; this change should have had a much
greater impact on counties in states that had laws prohibiting
payday lending but were unable to enforce these laws.
IV. Measuring the Effect of Payday Lending
This Article searches for a correlation between the legalization
of payday lending and various measures of financial hardship. I use
three basic measures: bankruptcy, property crime rates, and
landlord–tenant disputes. I focus most heavily on bankruptcy
2005 regulations “do not directly prohibit partnering with third-party payday
lenders, [but] they do impose onerous capital requirements” and limit the
extensions, deferrals, and renewals for payday loans); Stegman, supra note 1, at
178–79 (discussing the Comptroller of the Currency’s advisories “that promised
closer scrutiny and additional examinations of banks and thrifts that were
partnering with payday loan companies”). Also, “[i]n July 2003, the FDIC issued
its own guidelines for state-chartered banks engaged with payday lenders.” Id.
at 179.
91. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 877.
92. See id. at 879–80 (“What raises our interest, however, is the utter
absence of New York locations from the annual reports of the large national
providers.”).
93. See id. at 866 (“On the other hand, the majority of stores in the
industry are still small shops as large national providers have less than 5000
locations, far less than a quarter of the total stores. The mom-and-pop providers
still dominate the market.”).
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because it is the more common measure of financial distress and, as
a federal law, has a common meaning across states. Bankrupt
consumers can choose to file under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.94
Chapter 7 offers the consumer a quick discharge of her unsecured
debts, but the consumer can only keep assets used as collateral (the
car, the home) if her secured creditor consents; Chapter 13 offers the
consumer more protection against these secured creditors, but if she
is to receive a discharge the consumer must remain in bankruptcy
and make payments for three to five years.95 I do not have a strong
theory predicting that payday lending should have a different
impact depending on the type of bankruptcy, and so I test for the
effect on total nonbusiness bankruptcies, nonbusiness Chapter 7
bankruptcies, and Chapter 13 bankruptcies. All measures are
expressed per 100,000 individuals.96 I use county-level data from
1998 through 2009 provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts.97 Bankruptcy is, however, an imperfect measure of financial
94. Consumers can also file under Chapter 11, but very few do. Of the
1,536,799 nonbusiness bankruptcies filed in 2010, just 1,939 (.01%) were filed
under Chapter 11. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Cts., Bankruptcy Statistics,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (last visited Apr.
10, 2012) (providing statistics and tables on United States bankruptcy filings
dating back as far as the 1990s) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
95. For a description of these options, see BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 2007).
96. I used county population estimates from the Bureau of the Census.
Bureau of the Census, Population and Housing Unit Estimates (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although I have bankruptcy data
for 2010, county population estimates for 2010 were incomplete. I tested both
the filing rate and the log of the filing rate, though I do not have a strong
theoretical reason to choose one over the other, and the residuals of each type of
regression approximate a normal distribution due to the inclusion of both fixedcounty and fixed-year effects. The results of the log regressions are similar to
those of the untransformed variables and are available upon request.
97. 2010 data is available as well, but I do not have population data for all
counties in 2010. Specifically, I use bankruptcies listed in Report F5-A
downloaded from PACER. The Administrative Office data lists a small number
of filings in the “wrong” jurisdiction. For example, filings for Los Angeles County
appear in multiple districts within California. I tried two approaches. First, I
simply summed the number of bankruptcies for a given county regardless of
where the petition was filed. Second, I used only the highest number of
bankruptcies filed in a single district for that county. There is no real difference
in the two approaches. Even after converting the data into filing rates (dividing
by population), the correlation between the two measures is approximately
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distress. The available evidence suggests that the vast majority of
consumers who cannot or will not repay their debts do not file for
bankruptcy.98 Many debtors are simply too broke to file; attorneys’
fees average more than $1,000 in Chapter 7, and in some
jurisdictions, Chapter 13 attorneys’ fees average $4,000.99
Consumers who take out payday loans may be especially unlikely to
file. In 2008, Virginia’s payday lenders charged off 104,832 checks
as uncollectible.100 By contrast, Virginians filed 27,580 nonbusiness
bankruptcy petitions in 2008,101 and it is likely that many bankrupt
debtors never visited a payday lender.
Adair Morse suggests that the presence of payday lending can
have a measurable effect on the crime rate.102 I test this by
examining the change in the number of burglaries, larcenies, motor
vehicle thefts, and all property crimes after the legalization of
payday lending.103 All crime rates are expressed per 100,000
residents. Insolvent consumers may have difficulty paying their
rent, and I test whether there is a change in the rate of eviction
after the legalization of payday lending. Specifically, I look at the
0.995. I therefore present the results for the measure that sums bankruptcies
for each county across all districts.
98. See Amanda Dawsey, Richard M. Hynes & Lawrence Ausubel, The
Regulation of Non-Judicial Debt Collection and the Consumer’s Choice Among
Repayment, Bankruptcy and Informal Bankruptcy 1 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch. Law
& Econs. Research Paper Series,Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1487649 (noting that the
“majority of defaulting consumers do not file for bankruptcy”).
99. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: DOLLAR
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005 8 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08697.pdf (estimating the average attorneys’ fees for a Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 bankruptcy).
100. BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 37, at 7.
101. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CTS., TABLE F-2: U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS–
BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CASES COMMENCED BY CHAPTER OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2008
(2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Statistical
TablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2008/dec08/F02Dec08.pdf.
102. See Morse, supra note 11, at 29 (analyzing whether payday “loans
mitigate or exacerbate the effect of financial distress on individuals’ welfare as
measured by foreclosures and small property crimes”).
103. The number of these arrests is taken from the Uniform Crime
Reporting Program Data, and I use data from 1996–2008. I test total property
crimes, larceny, burglary, and motor vehicle thefts.
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number of landlord–tenant disputes in Florida,104 Maryland,105 and
North Carolina.106 Litigation rates vary dramatically from state to
state due to differences in landlord–tenant and civil procedure
rules,107 and the model relies on fixed-county effects to account for
many of these differences. North Carolina prohibited payday
lending in December of 2005, providing the basis of this test.108 I am
also able to make use of the change in FDIC rules, as this change
and an increase in penalties for violating usury laws caused some
national lenders to withdraw from the North Carolina market.
A. The Effect of Changes in State Laws Regulating Payday Lending
Equation 1: yit=α + β1*Paydayi,t-1 + β2*Unempi,t-1 + β3*(Unempi,t-1)2 +
β4*Exempi,t + β5*(Exempi,t)2+ β6*Paydayi,t-1 *Militaryi + β7*Paydayi,t-1
*(Militaryi)2 + β8*Paydayi,t-1 *Minorityi + β9*Paydayi,t-1 *(Minorityi)2 +
β10*Paydayi,t-1 *Incl15i+ β11*Paydayi,t-1 *Inc1550 i + β12*BAPCPAi,t
*Militaryi + β13* BAPCPAi,t *(Militaryi)2 + β14* BAPCPAi,t *Minorityi
+ β15* BAPCPAi,t *(Minorityi)2 + β16* BAPCPAi,t *Incl15i + β16*
BAPCPAi,t *Inc1550 i + ui+vt + eit
I begin first with regressions that focus solely on state laws.
Equation 1 presents the full specification. All regressions include
fixed-county and fixed-year effects; the fixed-county effects will
account for any differences between counties that do not change
over time, and the fixed-year effects will account for any
macroeconomic shocks or legal changes that affected all counties
104. Statistics for evictions in County Civil Courts in Florida are available
at http://trialstats.flcourts.org/.
105. Statistics for District Court landlord–tenant filings in Maryland are
available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications.html.
106. The North Carolina Courts sent statistics on Summary Ejectment by
County by email. Georgia also makes county-level eviction data available, but I
do not use it in the presented regressions for reasons described below.
107. For a discussion of these differences, see Richard M. Hynes, Broke But
Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Court, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1
(2008).
108. See Scott A. Hefner, Payday Lending in North Carolina: Now You See
It, Now You Don’t, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 263, 264 (2007) (“On December 22,
2005, Commissioner of Banks, Joseph A. Smith, Jr., put an end to ‘rent-acharter’ payday lending in North Carolina by holding that the practice violated
the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act.”).
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equally. All regressions also include the unemployment rate in the
county from the prior year (Unempi,t-1), and regressions that use the
bankruptcy filing rate as the dependent variable include the real
value (adjusted for inflation) of property exemptions available in the
state, which is measured by the exemptions available to married
homeowners with two children (Exempi,t).109 To account for any
nonlinear effects (e.g., the effect of a ten thousand dollar increase in
exemptions may not be equal to ten times the effect of a one
thousand dollar increase in exemptions), I include the squared value
of these terms. I use the county as the unit of observation, and
county population varies tremendously. My regressions are
weighted by the county’s population in 2000. All standard errors
allow for clustering at the state level.
The regressions include a dummy variable equal to one if
payday lending was legal in that state in the prior year
(Paydayi,t-1);110 I lag this variable as there is usually some delay
between the time of the onset of financial distress and the filing
of a bankruptcy petition.111 The coefficient on this dummy
variable estimates the change in the measure of financial
distress (bankruptcy, crime, or landlord–tenant litigation) after
a state legalizes payday lending.
Prior research suggests that payday lenders locate in areas
with large military or minority populations.112 If this is correct, we
should expect the legalization or prohibition of payday lending to
have a disproportionate effect in these areas. I therefore include the
interaction between the dummy for payday lending and the percent
109. Many states have exemptions that are limited by type rather than
dollar amount. To minimize this problem, I consider only homestead
exemptions, automobile exemptions, and exemptions that can be used to exempt
cash (“wildcard” exemptions). Unfortunately, a few states have “unlimited”
homestead or motor-vehicle exemptions. To address this, I cap the value of a
homestead exemption at $500,000 in 2005 and the motor-vehicle exemption at
$30,000. For other years, I adjust the caps for inflation.
110. If payday lending were legal in only part of that year, I set the dummy
variable equal to that fraction of the year in which payday lending was legal.
111. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann & Katherine M. Porter, Saving Up for
Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 292 (2010) (examining “why people file
[bankruptcy] when they do and what distinguishes those who choose to file from
those who delay or avoid filing”).
112. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (providing research that
suggests payday lenders target geographic locations with large military and
minority populations).
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of the population in 2000 that was nonwhite (Paydayi,t-1*minorityi)
and the percent of the workforce that was in the military (Paydayi,t1*militaryi).113 I include the square of each of these values to account
for nonlinear effects.
Prior research also suggests that the importance of payday
lending should vary by income. Very low-income households are
unlikely to use payday loans because they may not have
employment and a bank account; most payday-loan borrowers have
incomes between $15,000 and $50,000.114 I therefore interact the
payday-lending variable with the percentage of county households
that fell into various income categories (less than $15,000, $15,000–
$50,000, and more than $50,000) in 1999.
The 2005 bankruptcy reforms took effect in October of that
year, and the number of bankruptcies filed dropped by about 70%
between 2005 and 2006.115 Fixed-year effects will account for any
effects of this law that were uniform across the country. However,
the reforms may have had a disproportionate effect on the same
groups that we are using to test the impact of payday lending. For
example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates
113. Because these measures do not change over time, there is no need to
include the military and minority populations in a regression with fixed-county
effects.
114. See Melzer, supra note 23, at 523 (discussing individuals who generally
use payday loans). Specifically, Brian Melzer states:
Payday borrowers are not destitute, as very poor individuals
generally fail to meet the bank account ownership and employment
requirements of lenders. In surveys of payday borrowers, the vast
majority of respondents report family income between $15,000 and
$50,000, while only seven percent of borrowers report family incomes
below $15,000.
Id.
115. Nonbusiness bankruptcy filings were 2,039,214 in the twelve-month
period that ended December 31, 2005. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CTS., TABLE F-2:
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS–BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CASES
COMMENCED BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH
PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2005, (2005), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2005/
dec05/F02dec05.pdf. Then, nonbusiness bankruptcy filings fell to 597,965 in the
twelve-month period that ended December 31, 2006. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CTS.,
TABLE F-2: U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS–BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY
CASES COMMENCED BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12MONTH PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2006, (2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudi
ciary/2006/dec06/F02Dec06.pdf.
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that the average attorneys’ fees for the simplest form of bankruptcy
(Chapter 7) increased by 51% percent,116 and this may have a
disproportionate effect on lower-income or minority groups if these
groups are more cash constrained. Precisely which groups would be
most affected is, however, theoretically ambiguous because the
poorest debtors may have already found bankruptcy to be too
expensive. One existing empirical paper implies that this theoretical
effect may have been practically insignificant. Elizabeth Warren
and her co-authors searched the bankruptcy records and found that
“those who filed in 2007 largely have the same income profile as
those who filed in 2001”;117 they did not find evidence suggesting
that the reforms had a disproportionate effect on lower-income
households. I still control for a possible disparate effect by
interacting a dummy variable that equals after BAPCPA took effect
(BAPCPAi,t) with the same variables used to interact with payday
lending (minority, military populations, and income).
Table 1 presents summary statistics and Table 2 presents the
results. Although my focus is on payday lending, it is worth pausing
to note that the coefficients on unemployment take the expected
sign and are statistically significant. However, the coefficient on
exemptions is not statistically significant. This is roughly consistent
with prior literature, which fails to show a robust connection
between property exemptions and the filing rate.118 It is also worth
noting that the regressions suggest that the effect of the 2005
bankruptcy reforms may have varied significantly by county. In
particular, the reforms seem to have had the greatest effect in
counties in which a large percentage of households earn between
$15,000 and $50,000.

116. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 99, at 21 (“Based on
our sample of bankruptcy files, we estimate that the average attorney fee for a
Chapter 7 case has increased roughly 50 percent since the Bankruptcy Reform
Act.”).
117. See Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 353 (2008) (“The
data indicate that those who filed in 2007 largely have the same income profile
as those who filed in 2001 . . . .”). The authors of this study stressed the absence
of a change in the number of high-income filers rather than the absence of lowincome filers. Id.
118. See, e.g., Richard Hynes & Eric Posner, The Law and Economics of
Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168 (2002) (surveying the literature).
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The regressions presented in Table 2 do not provide
overwhelming support for either side of the debate, but they are
more consistent with the beneficial view of payday lending than the
debt–trap hypothesis. The beneficial view of payday lending predicts
that legalization should cause a decrease in bankruptcy filings, and
that this decrease should be more pronounced in areas where
payday lenders choose to locate—areas with large military,
minority, and moderate-income populations. The debt–trap
hypothesis predicts the opposite—legalization should increase
bankruptcy filings, and this increase should be more pronounced in
areas with large military, minority, and moderate income
populations. The regression that excludes all interactions (Column 1
of Table 2A) does estimate a positive effect on the bankruptcy filing
rate, but this estimate is not statistically significant. From the
perspective of the debt–trap hypothesis, all of the interaction terms
have the wrong sign. Although the coefficients on the interactions
between payday lending and moderate income and minority
population variables are not statistically significant, the coefficients
on the interaction with the percentage of the workforce in the
military are negative and statistically significant. The signs of the
interaction terms lend some support to the beneficial view of payday
lending. However, to make the claim that the legalization of payday
lending decreases bankruptcy filings in areas with large military
populations, one must consider the coefficients on Paydayi,t-1,
Paydayi,t-1*militaryi, and Paydayi,t-1*(militaryi)2. Column 5 estimates
that legalization reduces bankruptcy filings in counties in which the
percentage of the workforce is between 2% and 21%. Only five of the
3,109 counties for which I have data have military populations that
account for more than 21% of the workforce, and only one of these
counties has a population that exceeds 100,000.119 If a county’s
workforce were 5% military, the number of nonbusiness bankruptcy
filings per 100,000 would fall by between 54% and 87% (12%–19%)
after the legalization of payday lending.
Table 2B shows that the results are fairly robust against
alternative specifications. Only the coefficients on the interaction
between payday lending and military employment are consistently
119. These counties are Chattahoochee, GA (population of 14,990, 60.3%),
Liberty, GA (population of 61,448, 27.8%), Pulaski, MO (population of 41,712,
26.9%), Onslow, NC (population of 149,774, 28.2%), and Coryell, TX (population
of 75,010, 23.9%).
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significant. The first Column of Table 2B demonstrates that basic
results continue to hold when one examines the log of the filing rate.
Extremely large counties can have substantial intracounty
diversity, and extremely small counties may have too few residents
to yield reliable results. Column 1 therefore excludes counties with
year 2000 populations that exceed 1,000,000 or fall below 10,000;
the results remain largely the same. Military families may also be
unusually reluctant to file for bankruptcy; perhaps they are simply
more willing to endure the financial distress caused by payday
lending without filing. However, the results do not materially
change if I reduce the population of each county by the percentage of
the workforce that is in the military (Column 3). The bankruptcy
reforms of 2005 had a profound effect on bankruptcy practice,120 and
the interaction variables and fixed-year effects may not adequately
control for these changes. Column 4 therefore excludes all data from
after 2004. This exclusion has the added benefit of excluding any
effects of the 2007 federal law that prohibits high-interest loans to
military personnel.121 The coefficient on the interaction between
payday lending and the military population does fall, but it remains
negative and significant at the 11% level.122 Column 5 allows for
state-specific trends in the bankruptcy filing rate and, again, the
basic results do not change. Columns 6 and 7 look only at Chapter 7
filings, and Columns 8 and 9 look only at Chapter 13 filings. It is
only if one restricts attention to Chapter 13 filings that the
interaction between payday lending and the military population
loses its significance.
Table 2C examines the interaction between the legalization of
payday lending, the crime rate, and the number of eviction suits.
The results are, again, more consistent with the beneficial view of
payday lending. The basic specifications suggest that the crime rate
(measured by all property crimes, burglary, and larceny) tends to
fall after the legalization of payday lending. However, we should
expect any effect from the legalization of payday lending to be most
120. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing how nonbusiness
bankruptcy filings fell dramatically after the 2005 bankruptcy reforms).
121. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing the 2007 federal
law prohibiting high-interest loans to military personnel).
122. Because of the negative (but statistically insignificant) coefficient on
payday lending alone, Column 4 predicts a negative effect on payday lending
over a larger range of military employment—up to about 31%.
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concentrated where these lenders tend to locate, and most of the
interaction terms are statistically insignificant. Only the interaction
between the legalization of payday lending and the minority
population is statistically significant, and this is only true for the
regression using burglary as the dependent variable. While these
regressions are more consistent with the beneficial view of payday
lending, they provide only weak support for this view.
B. The End of the Rent-a-Charter Era
Although the state-law analysis provides little support for the
debt–trap hypothesis,123 this may be due to the difficulty of
determining the presence of payday lending. Some states that
technically prohibited payday lending may have been unwilling to
devote the resources necessary to enforce the law. Other states may
have wanted to enforce the law but were unable to do so due to the
ability of payday lenders to partner with out-of-state banks.124
Finally, states that expect the level of financial distress to increase
due to other factors may be less likely to approve payday lending out
of a fear that their citizens would be particularly vulnerable. This
would bias the results against the debt–trap hypothesis. Of course,
states that expect an increase in financial distress due to other
factors may be more likely to approve payday lending to increase the
availability of credit. This could bias the results in favor of the debt–
trap hypothesis; the net direction of the bias is unknown.
This subpart presents the results of an alternative test that is
less sensitive to these problems. Specifically, it looks to the FDIC
regulatory changes that effectively eliminated the rent-a-charter
era.125 This change should have had very little effect in states that
allowed payday lending or in states, such as New York, that
somehow managed to enforce their payday lending laws before the

123. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the debt–trap
hypothesis and explaining its rationale).
124. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 872 (“During the early years of
this decade . . . many banks partnered with large national providers so that
those providers could use the federal preemptive shelter available to the banks
to operate programs that otherwise would have violated state usury laws.”).
125. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (discussing the end of
the rent-a-charter era.)
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change.126 This test solves the problem created by the potential
effect of financial distress on the choice of payday lending
regulation, but it does so at the cost of statistical power. I exclude
counties in states that changed their laws regulating payday
lending during the window studied. I begin my window in 2003 to
reduce the number of states lost. The counties in North Carolina
and Pennsylvania are my treated observations.127 Because this test
focuses on changes in the laws of just two states, there is more of a
risk that the results could be due to omitted variables.
The FDIC action should have had an effect similar to the
prohibition of payday lending. To avoid confusion about the meaning
of the sign of a variable, I define FDIC to be a dummy variable equal
to zero if the FDIC action affected a state in a given year; otherwise,
it is equal to one. If payday lending reduces financial distress, the
coefficients on FDIC and the interactions with military and minority
populations should be negative (as with prior regressions). The
FDIC changes should have reduced financial distress in the treated
states, and this effect should have been most pronounced in counties
with large military and minority populations.
Table 3 examines changes in the bankruptcy filing rate, and the
results do not offer significant support for either the beneficial or the
detrimental view of payday lending. The most basic specification
(Column 1 of Table 3A) once again does not yield a statistically
significant estimate of the effect of the legalization of payday
lending on bankruptcy filings. Unlike the results of the tests based
on changes in state law (Table 2), the coefficients on the interaction
between payday lending and large military and minority
populations are positive rather than negative. However, only
military or minority interaction coefficients in Columns 1, 3, and 5
of Table 3B are statistically significant, and none of the military or
minority interaction coefficients in Table 3A are statistically
significant. In other words, some of the regressions suggest that the
126. See id. at 880 (finding that “New York has managed to exclude payday
lenders . . . through conspicuously aggressive enforcement” of its payday lending
laws).
127. Although payday lending has always been illegal in Georgia, the
Georgia legislature made payday lending a felony in May of 2004. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-17-2(d) (2011). I exclude Georgia as a state that changed its laws on
payday lending during the relevant period. The results are not very different if
one includes Georgia, although a few more coefficients are statistically
significant.
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FDIC’s prohibition on the rent-a-charter arrangement reduced
bankruptcies in counties with large military or minority populations
relative to other counties within the state, but this result does not
hold in most specifications. Moreover, four specifications suggest
that the FDIC action prohibiting the rent-a-charter arrangements
actually increased the number of bankruptcies in areas in which a
large percentage of households earn between $15,000 and $50,000—
the very households that are likely to frequent payday lenders.128
The regressions using the crime rate or the eviction rate (Table
3C) do not offer clear support for either side in the debate, but they
are once again more consistent with the beneficial view of payday
lending. Only the larceny-rate regression suggests an increase in
the relative crime rate in states affected by the FDIC’s change,
though the total property crime rate comes close to significance at
the 10% level. Each regression that includes an interaction term
suggests that the change in the crime rate was more pronounced in
areas with large military or minority populations.
V. Conclusion
The recent debates over payday lending are the latest
installment in a centuries-old conflict over high-interest loans. By
now, the theoretical arguments are clearly defined. Those who
oppose regulation cite the freedom of contract129 or claim that credit
can help smooth consumption and mitigate income and expense
shocks.130 Those who support regulation claim that high-interest
loans ensnare consumers in a debt trap and increase financial

128. See JOHN P. CASKEY, THE ECONOMICS OF PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2002)
(“Surveys of payday loan customers find that . . . about half of the customers
reported household incomes of between $25,000 and $50,000. The remaining
customers were almost equally divided between those with household incomes
under $25,000 and those with incomes over $50,000.”).
129. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft
Protection 32–33 (Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 1141, 2011), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/
Overdraft_Protection_Zywicki10.24.11.pdf (arguing that “freedom of contract is
most likely more efficient than regulation” to protect consumers from highinterest payday loans).
130. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text (referencing and
discussing scholarly works that propound the benefits of payday lending).
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hardship.131 Still others maintain that regulation is likely to be
ineffective because consumers and lenders will find ways to evade
the law.132 Given the theoretical ambiguity, empirical tests can play
an important role in guiding policymakers. Unfortunately, the
existing empirical tests are inconclusive. Some studies find that
payday loans increase signs of financial distress, some find that they
reduce signs of distress, and still others fail to find a statistically
significant effect.133
This Article uses the claim that payday lenders target military
and minority populations to test the relationship between payday
lending and evidence of financial hardship. The results are similarly
mixed. Consistent with the beneficial view of payday lending, this
Article finds that as states legalize payday lending the bankruptcy
filing rate tends to fall in counties with large military populations.
While this result is robust against a variety of alternative
specifications, I failed to find a statistically significant effect in areas
with large minority populations.
I supplement this first test with another that examines the
effect of the FDIC’s efforts to end the partnership between banks
and payday lenders in 2005.134 This move should have had the effect
of banning payday lending in some states where payday lending was
otherwise legal. These results provide less support for the beneficial
view of payday lending, but they do not support the debt–trap
hypothesis either. On balance, the results do not suggest that the
FDIC’s reform caused a statistically significant change in
bankruptcy filing rates in counties with large military or minority
populations.

131. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the debt–trap
hypothesis and explaining its rationale).
132. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (describing how some
scholars take an agnostic view of payday lending and arguing that both lenders
and consumers find ways to evade payday lending laws).
133. See supra notes 55–77 and accompanying text (discussing prior
empirical research on payday lending and the policy perspectives that each
supports).
134. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of
the FDIC’s 2005 regulatory efforts to end the partnerships between banks and
payday lenders).
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics (Weighted by County Population in 2000)
Variable
Payday: One if payday lending legal in prior year
(1998–2009)

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

40,417

0.59

0.49

Nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000

37,296

455

249

Chapter 7 nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000

37,296

323

181

Chapter 13 bankruptcies per 100,000

37,296

131

140

Property crime arrests per 100,000

40,411

535

311

Burglary arrests per 100,000

40,411

96

66

Larceny arrests per 100,000

40,411

389

247

Motor vehicle theft arrests per 100,000

40,411

45

44

1,701

3,032

6,208

34,174

5.00

1.84

49,278

16.81

20.41

Landlord tenant suits in lower court per 100,000
Unemployment rate in prior year
Exemptions: Sum of homestead and personal
property exemptions available to married couples in
tens of thousands of 2008 dollars with caps on
unlimited exemptions
Military: military as percent of civilian and
government workforce

3,109

0.53

1.83

Minority: Nonwhite as percent of population
Inc.<15: percent of households with income less than
$15,000 in 1999
Inc.15–50: percent with income between $15,000 and
$50,000

3,109

24.9

17.1

3,109

16

6

3,109

42

7

Inc.>50: percent with income greater than $50,000

3,109

42

12
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Table 2A: Bankruptcy Filing Rate after Legalization of Payday Lending135
Payday

(1)
5.52
(0.81)

(2)
57.16+
(0.05)

Payday*Military
Payday*Military^2

(3)
22.48
(0.22)
-27.64*
(0.01)
1.15*
(0.01)

(4)
59.11*
(0.05)
-24.91*
(0.02)
1.07*
(0.02)
-2.62+
(0.09)
0.03
(0.20)

-9.43*
(0.02)
0.18
(0.18)

-3.06
(0.11)
0.03
(0.34)

Payday*Minority
Payday*Minority ^2
Payday*Inc.<15
Payday*Inc.15–50

BAPCPA*Minority

-1.48
(0.42)

-7.97*
(0.04)
0.15
(0.24)
-1.24
(0.50)

BAPCPA*Minority^2

0.01
(0.76)

0.01
(0.84)

BAPCPA*Military
BAPCPA*Military^2

52.17*
(0.00)
-1.53*
(0.00)
-5.36
(0.51)
0.09
(0.41)
37,270

49.99*
(0.00)
-1.48*
(0.00)
-5.42
(0.51)
0.09
(0.43)
37,270

51.93*
(0.00)
-1.54*
(0.00)
-5.55
(0.49)
0.09
(0.40)
37,270

50.15*
(0.00)
-1.50*
(0.00)
-5.50
(0.50)
0.09
(0.43)
37,270

0.02
(0.44)
3.159+
(0.08)
-7.88*
(0.00)
47.90*
(0.00)
-1.43*
(0.00)
-6.75
(0.35)
0.09
(0.34)
37,270

0.65
3,107

0.65
3,107

0.65
3,107

0.65
3,107

0.67
3,107

BAPCPA*Inc.<15
BAPCPA*Inc.15–50
Unemp
Unemp^2
Exemp
Exemp^2
Observations
R-Sq.
No. of Ctycode

(5)
48.03
(0.67)
-26.95*
(0.02)
1.15*
(0.02)
-2.16
(0.16)
0.02
(0.34)
0.59
(0.69)
-0.04
(0.99)
-2.40
(0.50)
0.11
(0.33)
-3.34+
(0.07)

135. The dependent variable is all nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000
population. All regressions have 3,107 county codes and 37,270 observations.
All regressions included fixed-year effects and fixed-county effects. Standard
errors are clustered by state. Robust p values are in parentheses. * p<0.05, +
p<0.1.

-23.47*
(0.02)
1.003*
(0.02)
-2.14
(0.21)
0.02
(0.37)
0.25
(0.87)

-0.05*
(0.01)
0.003*
(0.01)
0.00
(0.39)
0.00
(0.83)
0.009*
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.35)

Payday
*Military
Payday
*Military^2
Payday
*Minority
Payday
*Minority^2
Payday
*Inc.<15
Payday
*Inc. 15K to
50K

No. of Ctycode

R-Squared
3,107

0.78

36,957

-1.49
(0.99)

0.24
(0.45)

Payday

Observations

“Medium”
Counties

2,397

0.68

28,750

0.95
(0.54)

(2)

(1)
Log of
Filing
Rate

3,107

0.67

37,270

-0.01
(1.00)

0.57
(0.70)

0.02
(0.33)

-2.16
(0.16)

1.136*
(0.02)

-26.39*
(0.02)

46.63
(0.68)

NonMilitary

(3)

3,107

0.39

21,749

2.57
(0.42)

4.06*
(0.04)

-0.02
(0.30)

3,107

0.70

37,270

0.66
(0.69)

3.39
(0.12)

-0.01
(0.61)

-0.28
(0.86)

0.721*
(0.04)

0.705+
(0.07)
0.43
(0.74)

-16.47+
(0.08)

-50.86
(0.40)

State
Trends

(5)

-17.96
(0.10)

-130.90
(0.36)

Pre2005

(4)

3,107

0.68

37,27
0

6.26
(0.80)

Ch. 7

(6)

3,107

0.69

32,270

-0.99
(0.61)

1.09
(0.45)

0.02
(0.42)

-2.01
(0.13)

1.004*
(0.01)

-22.89*
(0.02)

78.41
(0.48)

Ch. 7

(7)

Table 2B: Bankruptcy Filing Rate After Legalization of Payday Lending (Payday)136

3,107

0.20

32,27
0

-0.57
(0.95)

Ch.
13

(8)

3,107

0.25

37,270

0.91
(0.29)

-0.46
(0.68)

0.00
(0.65)

-0.16
(0.79)

0.15
(0.50)

-4.09
(0.47)

-28.95
(0.30)

Ch.
13

(9)
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136. The dependent variable in Column 1 uses the log of the bankruptcy filing
rate. Column 2 excludes counties with a population in the year 2000 that was either
greater than 1,000,000 or less than 10,000. Column 3 multiplies the bankruptcy
filing rate by the percent of employment that is nonmilitary. Column 4 uses only
data from before 2005. Column 5 includes state-specific trends as explanatory
variables. Columns 6 and 7 examine the Chapter 7 filing rate and Columns 8 and 9
examine the Chapter 13 filing rate. All regressions included fixed-year effects and
fixed-county effects as well as the unemployment rate, exemptions, and the square
of the unemployment rate and exemptions. Regressions that include data from 2005
and after include interactions with BAPCPA. Standard errors are clustered by
county. Robust p values are in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

No. of Ctycode

R-squared

Observations

3,108

0.19

40,38
4

3,108

0.20

40,384

40,384
0.13
3,108

40,384
0.12
3,108

3,108

0.17

3,108

0.18

40,384

-2.93
(0.25)

-3.51
(0.22)

Payday* Inc. 15K
to 50K
-0.48
(0.22)

3.37
(0.28)

0.12
(0.87)

3.59
(0.31)

Payday* Military
Payday*
Military^2

Payday*Inc.<15K

-2.99
(0.58)
0.24
(0.29)
-2.26
(0.28)

79.18
(0.30)

0.01
(0.62)

40,384

-41.34*
(0.03)

Larceny

(6)

0.00
(0.55)

0.40
(0.75)
0.01
(0.82)
-0.674*
(0.02)

21.59*
(0.03)

(5)

0.02
(0.65)

-12.74*
(0.00)

Burglary

(4)

Payday*Minority^
2

110.30
(0.24)

(3)

Payday* Minority

-56.05
(0.01)

All Property
Crime

(2)

-2.49
(0.66)
0.24
(0.33)
-3.18
(0.20)

Payday

Variables

(1)

Table 2C: Legalization of Payday Lending and Other Proxies for Distress137
(8)

3,108

0.10

40,384

-1.39
(0.71)

3,108

0.11

40,384

-0.14
(0.78)

0.13
(0.80)

0.00
(0.81)

0.27
(0.87)
-0.01
(0.85)
-0.25
(0.54)

10.82
(0.57)

Motor Vehicle
Theft

(7)

(10)

189

0.06

1,701

20.90
(0.85)

189

0.08

1,701

15.46
(0.20)

0.82
(0.88)

-0.07
(0.27)

(0.11)
6.73
(0.29)

-31.83
(0.10)

-814.9*
(0.04)

Eviction Suits

(9)

PAYDAY LENDING
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137. All dependent variables are expressed per 100,000 population. All
regressions included fixed-year effects, fixed-county effects, the unemployment
rate and the square of the unemployment rate, and interactions with BAPCPA.
Standard errors are clustered by county. Robust p values are in parentheses. *
p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 3A: Bankruptcy Filing Rate After FDIC’s Act to End “Rent-A-Charter” Era138

FDIC

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

43.25

-14.37

40.74

358.1*

319.5*

(0.17)

(0.53)

(0.21)

(0.00)

(0.00)

FDIC*Military
FDIC*Military^2
FDIC*Minority
FDIC*Minority^2

6.95

4.53

(0.18)

(0.55)

-0.30

0.01

(0.23)

(0.97)

2.05

0.13

(0.33)

(0.95)

0.01

0.02

(0.65)

(0.31)

FDIC*Inc.<15K
FDIC* Inc. 15–50
Observations

7.52+

4.27+

(0.08)

(0.10)

-10.32*

-8.70*

(0.00)

(0.00)

18,095

18,095

18,095

18,095

18,095

R-squared

0.74

0.75

0.74

0.77

0.77

No. of Ctycode

2,587

2,587

2,587

2,587

2,587

138. The dependent variable is all nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000
population. All regressions included fixed-year effects, fixed-county effects, the
unemployment rate, exemptions, the square of the unemployment rate and
exemptions, and interactions with BAPCPA. Standard errors are clustered by
state. Robust p values are in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 3B: Bankruptcy Filings After FDIC’s Act to End “Rent-A-Charter” Era139
(1)
Log of
Filing
Rate

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

“Medium”
Counties

State
Trends

Ch. 7

Ch. 7

Ch. 13

Ch. 13

0.40
(0.16)

230.7*
(0.00)

7.36
(0.96)

FDIC*Military

0.01
(0.44)

8.41
(0.11)

9.35*
(0.00)

14.34*
(0.02)

-0.95
(0.71)

FDIC*Military^2

0.00
(0.82)

-0.09
(0.66)

-0.11
(0.20)

-0.388+
(0.07)

0.02
(0.79)

0.00585*
(0.08)

0.18
(0.93)

2.80
(0.13)

0.26
(0.89)

0.60
(0.48)

FDIC*Minority^2

0.00
(0.26)

-0.02
(0.65)

-0.04
(0.12)

-0.01
(0.74)

0.01
(0.25)

FDIC*Inc.<15

0.01
(0.22)

0.28
(0.91)

6.27*
(0.02)

2.90
(0.22)

2.10*
(0.07)

FDIC* Inc. 15–50

-0.01
(0.14)

-5.39*
(0.00)

-3.61
(0.22)

-6.28*
(0.00)

-0.93
(0.69)

18,981

13,601

19,208

18,095

18,095

19,208

19,208

R-Squared

0.861

0.768

0.817

0.763

0.793

0.298

0.343

No. of Ctycode

2,745

1,945

2,746

2,587

2,587

2,746

2,746

FDIC*Minority

Observations

4.03
(0.88)

211.9+
(0.06)

45.73*
(0.00)

26.31
(0.76)

FDIC

139. The dependent variable in Column 1 uses the log of the bankruptcy
filing rate. Column 2 excludes counties with a population in the year 2000 that
was either greater than 1,000,000 or less than 10,000. Column 3 includes statespecific trends as explanatory variables. Column 4 and 5 examine the Chapter 7
filing rate and Column 6 and 7 examine the Chapter 13 filing rate. All
regressions included fixed-year effects and fixed-county effects as well as the
unemployment rate, exemptions, and the square of the unemployment rate and
exemptions. Standard errors are clustered by county. Robust p values are in
parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

2.66*
(0.00)
0.05*
(0.00)
-2.09
(0.37)
0.98
(0.42)
15,513

15,51
3
0.04
2,588

FDIC*Minority

FDIC*Minority
^2
FDIC*Inc.<15

FDIC*Inc.15–50

Observations
R-Squared
No. of Ctycode
2,588

0.04

0.15
(0.27)

FDIC*Military
^2

-0.92
(0.98)
-5.263+
(0.06)

-17.47
(0.12)

All Property
Crimes

(2)

FDIC*Military

FDIC

Variables

(1)

(4)

2,588

0.01

15,51
3

1.25
(0.78)

2,588

0.01

15,513

0.55
(0.43)

-1.01
(0.16)

0.01
(0.20)

0.68*
(0.02)

-0.04
(0.18)

0.37
(0.60)

0.33
(0.99)

Burglary

(3)

Table 3C: FDIC and Other Proxies for Distress140

2,588

0.05

15,513

(6)

2,588

0.05

15,513

1.14+
(0.08)

-1.87
(0.13)

0.020*
(0.03)

-0.99+
(0.09)

0.12
(0.24)

-4.30*
(0.04)

-26.09
(0.27)

Larceny
-15.15*
(0.01

(5)

(8)

2,588

0.22

15,51
3

-3.36
(0.42)

2,588

0.28

15,513

-0.71*
(0.00)

0.86+
(0.10)

0.014*
(0.04)

-0.85*
(0.00)

0.077+
(0.08)

-1.57
(0.16)

22.90*
(0.00)

Motor Vehicle
Theft

(7)
(10)

189

0.09

1,134

257.80
(0.41)

189

0.18

1,134

-32.12+
(0.09)

-6.31
(0.54)

0.18*
(0.01)

-7.49*
(0.03)

0.50
(0.42)

-3.81
(0.59)

1,828+
(0.07)

Eviction Suits

(9)
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140. All dependent variables are expressed per 100,000 population. All
regressions included fixed-year effects, fixed-county effects, the unemployment
rate and the square of the unemployment rate, and interactions with BAPCPA.
Standard errors are clustered by county. Robust p values in parentheses. *
p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 4: State Laws on Payday Lending
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR

Legal in Period
6/30/2003
1/1/2005
4/1/2000–
7/1/2010
4/7/1999–
3/18/2008

CA
CO
CT
DE

1/1/1997
7/1/2000
Never
Always

FL

Always

GA

Never

HI
ID

7/1/1999
Always

IL

Always

IN

Always

IA
KS
KY
LA

Always
Always
Always
8/15/1997

ME

Never

MD
MA
MI
MN
MS

Never
Never
11/28/2005
Always legal
7/1/1998

Citation
ALA. CODE § 5-18A-1 et seq. (2011).
ALASKA STAT. § 06.50.400 (2011)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1251 (2011); http://www.azdfi.gov/
news/AG_Letter_to_Payday_Lenders_060910.pdf.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-52-101 et seq. (2011); ARK. CONST. of 1874, art.
XIX, § 13 (repealed 2011);
http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/elements/www.payday
loaninfo.org/File/08_07_attorney_general.pdf.
CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 23000–23106 (2011).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-101 (2011).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36A-563 (2011).
Delaware enacted licensing legislation effective 7/9/2002. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2227 et seq., 2744 (2011). I code Delaware as always
allowing payday lending due to an alleged lack of effective usury
limits on small loans.
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.401 et seq. (2011); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
69V-560.901 et seq. (2011). I code Florida as always allowing payday
lending because prior law did allow check cashers to charge fees for
cashing postdated checks.
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf.
Though payday lending has always been illegal in Georgia, the state
did pass legislation effective in May of 2004 that made the practice a
felony. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-17-1 to -10 (2011).
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480F-1 et seq. (2011).
Idaho enacted legislation effective 7/1/2003. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2846-401 et seq. (2011). I code Idaho as always allowing payday lending
due to an alleged lack of effective usury limits on small loans.
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf.
Illinois enacted legislation effective 12/6/2005. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 122/1-1 et seq. (2011). I code Illinois as always allowing payday
lending due to an alleged lack of effective usury limits on small loans.
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf.
Ind. Code Ann. § 24-4.5-7-101 et seq. (effective 3/14/2002). I code
Indiana as always allowing payday lending because prior law allowed
the lender to assess minimum fees of $33.
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 533D.1 et seq. (2011).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16A-2-404 (2011).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16A-2-404 (2011).
Act of June 11, 1997, no. 41, § 1, 1997 La. Acts 1, 132, repealed by Act
of July 12, 1999, no. 1315, ch. 2-A, 1999 La. Acts 2671, 3529; LA.
CONST. of 1974, art. III, § 19.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-a, § 2-401 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 6138 (2011).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-306(a)(2)(i) (2011).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 96 (2011).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2121 et seq. (2011).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.60 (2011).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-501 et seq. (2011).
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State Legal in Period
MO
Always legal
MT

Always legal

NE
NV

Always legal
7/1/1998

NH

1/1/2000–
1/1/2009
Never
Always legal

NJ
NM

NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR

Always illegal
10/1/1997–
8/31/1997
4/19/2001

PA
RI

9/1/2008
9/1/2003
Prohibited
7/1/2007
Never
7/1/2001

SC
SD

6/11/1998
Always

TN

10/1/1997

TX

9/1/1997

UT

Always

VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

Never
7/1/2002
Always
Never
Always
7/1/1996

Citation
MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.500 et seq. (2011); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4,
§ 140-11.010 et seq. (2011).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-701 et seq. (2011). I code Montana as always
allowing payday lending due to an alleged lack of effective usury
limits on small loans.
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-904 (2011).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 604.010 et seq. (2010), repealed by NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 604A.010 et seq. (2010).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A:1 et seq. (2011).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-19 (2011).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-33 (2011). I code New Mexico as always
allowing payday lending due to an alleged lack of effective usury
limits on small loans.
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (2011).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-281 (2011), amended by Act of July 31, 2001, ch.
323, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, 960 (expired 2001).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-01 et seq. (2011), amended by Act of Apr. 11,
2005, ch. 127, 2005 N.D. Laws 1, 661.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.35 et seq. (repealed 2008).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 3101 et seq. (2011).
OR. REV. STAT. § 725.625 (2011), repealed by Act of June 26, 2007, ch.
603, § 11, 2007 Or. Laws 993, 1569 (2007).
7 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6213 (2011).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 19-14.4-1, -4 (2011), amended by Act of July 9,
2005, ch. 230, § 1, 2005 R.I. Pub. Laws 755, 1302.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-39-110 et seq. (2011).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-4-36 et seq. (2011). I code South Dakota as
always allowing payday lending due to a lack of an effective small
loan usury cap. http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf
TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-101 et seq. (2011); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS.
0180-28-.01 (2011).
TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.251 et seq. (2011). Industry trade groups
list Texas as having unfavorable payday lending laws, but consumer
advocacy groups list Texas as having laws that are too favorable to
payday lending. The results are robust against a recoding of Texas as
prohibiting payday lending.
Utah enacted payday lending legislation effective 5/3/1999. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 7-23-101 et seq. (2011). I code Utah as always allowing
payday lending due to a lack of effective usury laws.
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41a (2011).
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1800 et seq. (2011).
WASH. REV. CODE § 31.45.010 et seq. (2011).
W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-107(2) (2011).
WIS. STAT. §§ 138.04, .05 (2011).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-362 et seq. (2011).

